The effect of the invasion on the risk of nuclear war between Russia and the US/NATO, both now and in the near future. How can this risk be reduced?

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has tested nuclear deterrence theory as it has not been tested since the Cuban Missile Crisis sixty years ago. At the current moment, it is evident that the United States and its NATO allies are avoiding any action that would implicate NATO in an attack against Russian territory. Russia, likewise, is appearing to avoid action that would amount to an attack against NATO, even though its strategic bombers have endured damage during an attack—unattributed—against bases far inside Russian territory.



According to Russian military doctrine, such an attack against nuclear assets could lead to nuclear escalation. However, so far Russia has exercised nuclear restraint, despite nuclear saber rattling emanating from Putin and the Kremlin, and also from Russian media sources. Thus, nuclear deterrence seems now to be holding, but in an uncertain and unnerving way. Are there steps that the NATO alliance can take at this critical moment to bolster nuclear deterrence and ensure that nuclear conflagration does not emerge from this crisis? Deterrence is an uncertain art, but NATO’s capabilities to message its force posture, resilience and resolve can all play an important role in trying to ensure that this worst case does not ensue. Some of these capabilities are controlled by the United States, but some are capabilities that the NATO allies in Europe provide.